Abstract: In the pursuit of peace between adversaries, deterrence and reassurance are complementary. To most, this is not intuitive. Deterrence comes from strength, they think, which should frighten a rival. Reassurance feels like comforting the enemy. As such, our instincts fail us.
In this essay, I apply scholarship on deterrence and assurance to the policy aim of maintaining peace in Northeast Asia. I draw especially on arguments developed in my book, “The Art of Coercion: Credible Threats and the Assurance Dilemma.” When it comes to threat-making, credibility is only half the battle. To stabilize deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, therefore, all parties ought to be reassuring one another.
The key takeaways are: Reassurance does not replace deterrence, it is complementary; denuclearization is a goal that reduces the stability of deterrence; military postures on the Korean Peninsula should support deterrence, including through conventional arms control.