Reid Pauly, dean’s assistant professor of nuclear security and policy, explores why coercion succeeds or fails in his new book, The Art of Coercion.
Strong states are surprisingly bad at coercion. History shows they prevail only a third of the time. Pauly argues that coercion often fails because targets fear punishment even if they comply. In this “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” scenario, targets have little reason to obey.
Pauly illustrates this logic in nuclear counterproliferation efforts with South Africa, Iraq, Libya and Iran. He shows that coercers face an “assurance dilemma”: When threats are more credible, assurances not to punish are less so. Without credible assurances, targets may defy threats, bracing for seemingly inevitable punishment. For coercion to work, coercers must not only make targets believe they will be punished if they do not comply, but also that they will not be punished if they do.