

# MARC TOBY GRINBERG

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The Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs  
111 Thayer Street, Providence, RI 02912

## EDUCATION

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<b>Stanford University</b> , Ph.D. in Political Science Fields of Study: International Relations, Political Theory, Political Methodology Committee: Kenneth Schultz (chair), James Fearon, Stephen Krasner, Jeremy Weinstein (Parental leave: 2017, 2020-2021)	<b>Summer 2021</b>
<b>University of Oxford</b> , M.Phil. in Politics Primary Field: Political Theory	<b>2008</b>
<b>Princeton University</b> , A.B. in Politics ( <i>Magna Cum Laude</i> ) Primary Field: International Relations	<b>2005</b>

## FELLOWSHIPS

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<b>Post-Doctoral Fellowship</b> , Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs Brown University	<b>2021-2023</b>
<b>Teaching Fellowship</b> , Stanford University	<b>2019-2020</b>
<b>Pre-Doctoral Fellowship</b> , Clements Center for National Security University of Texas at Austin	<b>2019-2020</b> <b>(Declined)</b>
<b>Pre-Doctoral Fellowship</b> , Carnegie International Policy Scholars Consortium & Network Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, Johns Hopkins SAIS	<b>2018-2019</b>
<b>Graduate Fellow</b> , Tobin Project	<b>2017-2018</b>
<b>Graduate Fellow</b> , Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation	<b>2016-2017</b>
<b>Graduate Public Service Fellow</b> , Stanford University	<b>2014-2015</b>

## RESEARCH

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### **Book Project (Dissertation)**

- Misuse and Manipulation: The Strategic Politics of Military Capacity Building

*Abstract:* How do states exercise control over military partners, particularly when building their military capacity? Typical solutions to these agency problems focus on the selection of partners with shared interests or the use inducements that reward compliance and punish misuse. While these strategies are employed by states, they are often insufficient. I argue argument that states also turn to a diverse set of strategies with a common theoretical logic that I call “strategies of manipulation.” While inducements alter the partner's payoffs to alternative outcomes, manipulation alters the partner's efficiency in producing these alternative outcomes. Specifically, strategies of manipulation create incentives for the partner to use transferred resources to advance the delegating state's objective by mitigating the partner's opportunities to bring about other outcomes through misuse. Using a difference-in-differences analysis of panel data on post-World War II interstate arms transfers and U.S. military training, policymaker interviews and illustrative historical cases, I show that concerns about misuse and strategies of manipulation motivate decision makers at important moments in history and can help explain broad patterns of arms transfers.

**Article Manuscripts (available on website)**

- “Strategies of Manipulation in the Delegation of Power Politics” (expect to submit Fall 2021)
- “Capacity Building, Misuse and the Causes of International Transfer of Arms” (expect to submit Fall 2021)
- “There is No Justice in Equality Among Slaves: Rescuing Egalitarianism from the Tamed Housewife” (expect to submit Spring 2021)
- “Choice-Sensitive Egalitarianism: A Conceptual Analysis” (expect to submit Spring 2021)

**Works in Progress (contact for access)**

- “The Self-Enforcing American Order” (presented at ISA 2019)
- “Self-Destroying Cooperation: Commitment Problems from Domestic Spillover of International Cooperation” (derived from dissertation)
- “Causal Inference Beyond the Water's Edge: Methodological Challenges to the Identification of Foreign Policy Effects” (presenting at APSA 2021)
- “A Gully or a Gap? Policy-Relevant Analysis of Foreign Policy Effects” (presenting at APSA 2021)

**INVITED CONFERENCE AND WORKSHOP PRESENTATIONS (SELECTED)**

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New Faces Conference, Triangle Institute for Security Studies	2019
Emerging Scholars in Grand Strategy Conference, University of Notre Dame	2019
Graduate Student Workshop, Tobin Project	2017

**TEACHING**

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**Primary Instructor**

- War and Peace in American Foreign Policy – undergraduate	2020
- International Relations Workshop (convenor)	2019-2020
- International Cooperation and Institutions – undergraduate	2018
- Solving Global Challenges – undergraduate	2018
- Solving Global Challenges – Master’s	2015

**PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (SELECTED)**

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<b>Section Chief</b>	2011-2012
<b>Director for Strategy and Long-Range Planning (acting)</b>	2011
<b>Strategist</b>	2009-2010
Office of Policy/Strategy, Planning, Analysis and Risk U.S. Department of Homeland Security	
<b>Special Assistant</b>	2010
Office of the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources U.S. Department of State	

REFERENCES

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**Kenneth Schultz**

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Stanford University  
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**Stephen Krasner**

Graham H. Stuart Professor, Emeritus  
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**James Fearon**

Theodore and Frances Geballe Professor  
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**Jeremy Weinstein**

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